California Conservative

Senator Feinstein & Senator Boxer:

This week, you both voted to continue the filibuster of the compromise on the Patriot Act. Sen. Boxer, why haven’t you issued a statement on why you’re filibustering this legislation. Sen. Feinstein, while I applaud you for at least making a speech on the Senate floor, I can’t come close to agreeing with a number of your statements in that speech, including these statements:

They have implied that the USA PATRIOT Act will expire in its entirety on December 31, and we will be left with no defense against terrorist acts. This, too, is untrue.

While it’s true that the entire Patriot Act won’t expire at midnight Dec. 31, the most important provision will, namely the section that tore down the Gorelick Wall that prohibited intelligence agencies from telling law enforcement about terrorist plots that they’d intercepted.

Dick Morris, writing in yesterday’s NY Post, tells of this report:

In 2002, the feds (presumably the NSA) picked up random cellphone chatter using the words “Brooklyn Bridge” (which apparently didn’t translate well into Arabic). They notified the New York Police Department, which flooded the bridge with cops. Then the feds overheard a phone call in which a man said things were “too hot” on the bridge to pull off an operation. Later, an interrogation of a terrorist allowed by the Patriot Act led cops to the doorstep of this would-be bridge bomber. (His plans would definitely have brought down the bridge, NYPD sources told me.)
Why didn’t Bush get a warrant? On who? For what? The NSA wasn’t looking for a man who might blow up the bridge. It had no idea what it was looking for. It just intercepted random phone calls from people in the United States to those outside, and so heard the allusions to the bridge that tipped them off.

Without that provision, the Brooklyn Bridge quite likely would’ve been blown to kingdom come. It’s simply irresponsible to block the re-authorization of the Patriot Act because it isn’t exactly what you want.

I fear that it is going to be a very divisive and partisan vote tomorrow. The USA PATRIOT Act has been a valuable tool in our effort to combat terror, but it has also become a divisive point of contention between Democrats and Republicans and, as a result, doesn’t have the broad support of the American people. Thus, it is extremely important that every effort be made to reach an accommodation before debate becomes contentious and even more partisan.

More important than more compromises on a bill that contains numerous compromises already seems alot like nitpicking to me. It’s also apparent to me that most Americans, if they knew that the provision allowing intelligence officials to talk with law enforcement was about to expire, wouldn’t care less about reaching “an accommodation.” I’m positive that 90+ percent of people would tell you to drop the objections and get this re-authorization passed ASAP.

Finally, what other compromises do you want included in this legislation? The DoJ issued this list of “Civil Liberties Safeguards” in the USA PATRIOT ACT:

• These protections include:
• Sections 102-103 (sunsets): The reauthorization bill includes four year sunsets on three provisions: section 206, which authorizes FISA multipoint (”roving”) electronic surveillance; section 215, which amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’s (FISA) business records provision; and the “lone wolf” provision from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
• Sections 106 and 106A (amending section 215): The reauthorization bill adds significant new safeguards to section 215 court orders. Specifically it:
• requires high-level approval for requests for sensitive categories of records such as library records and medical records;
• clarifies the appropriate standard for obtaining such an order;
• explicitly allows a judge to deny or modify an application;
• requires the use of so-called “minimization procedures” to limit retention and dissemination of information concerning United States Persons and protect privileged documents;
• explicitly clarifies that a recipient may disclose receipt to an attorney or others necessary to comply with the order;
• provides explicitly for judicial challenges to any section 215 order;
• for the first time requires public reporting of the number of section 215 orders; — requires additional and specific classified reporting to congressional overseers; and
• requires the Inspector General to conduct an audit of each Justice Department use of section 215.
• Section 107 (amending section 212): Section 107 adds a reporting requirement with respect to good-faith emergency disclosures to the government by electronic communications service providers and makes technical fixes to the law to clarify congressional intent.
• Section 108 (amending section 206): Section 108 imposes several additional safeguards on the use of multipoint electronic surveillance under FISA. Specifically it:
• requires additional specificity from an applicant before “roving” surveillance that follows a target from cell phone to cell phone may be authorized;
• clarifies that a judge granting surveillance must ensure in the order that the surveillance is authorized only for the target in the application;
• requires increased specificity for applications for surveillance where a description of the target, rather than the target’s actual identity, is provided to the court, so that each application describes a single, unique target;
• requires investigators to inform the court within 10 days when “roving” surveillance authority is used to target a new facility-such as when a terrorist or spy changes to a different cell phone;
• requires investigators to inform the court on an ongoing basis of the total number of places or facilities under surveillance pursuant to a “roving” surveillance order; and
• requires additional reporting to Congress.
• Section 109: Section 109 requires additional reporting to Congress on the use of FISA authorities and the FISA court to develop and publish rules of procedure.
• Section 114 (amending section 213): Section 114 adds several additional protections on the use of delayed-notice search warrants. Specifically it:
• requires a court to set a deadline for the initial period of delay, one that presumptively must be within 30 days of the search;
• requires the applicant to provide the court with an updated showing of necessity before the delay period may be extended;
• provides that any extension should be a period of 90 days or less except in exceptional circumstances; and
• requires public reporting on the use of delayed notice search warrants.
• Sections 115-119 (regarding National Security Letter authorities): The reauthorization bill adds significant new safeguards to each of the National Security Letter (NSL) statutes. The report:
• clarifies that a recipient may disclose receipt to an attorney or others necessary for compliance;
• provides explicitly for a judicial challenge to an NSL;
• provides that a nondisclosure order does not automatically attach to an NSL;
• provides explicit judicial review of a nondisclosure requirement accompanying an NSL;
• requires the Justice Department official to re-certify that nondisclosure is necessary, or else to let the nondisclosure provision lapse, if a nondisclosure requirement is challenged more than a year after the NSL issues;
• provides that only certifications by a few Senate-confirmed officials, made at the time a petition is filed, are entitled to a heightened degree of deference;
• adopts the Senate passed (by unanimous consent) standard of review for non-disclosure;
• for the first time, requires public reporting on the use of NSL authorities;
• requires additional reporting to Congress on the use of NSL authorities; and
• requires the Inspector General to conduct an audit of the Justice Department’s use of NSLs.
• Section 126: Section 126 requires a report to Congress on any use of data-mining programs by the Department of Justice.

Forgive me, Senators, but that seems like an awfully long list of Civil Liberties Safeguards to me. I suspect that most Californians, and indeed, most Americans, would side with me on this.

The long and short of this is: End the filibuster, pass the bill as is or face the wrath of the voters the next time you run. I will not have you standing in the way of my safety just because the bill doesn’t meet with your approval. This is a democracy, not a dictatorship. Putting American lives at risk because they don’t get everything they want is reckless and dangerous and smacks of elitism.

Cross-posted at BoxerWatch

This entry was posted on Wednesday, December 21st, 2005 at 6:27 am and is filed under Author: Gary Gross, Boxer, Feinstein, Homeland Security, Terrorism. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.