“An Incomplete Investigation”

Louis FreehThat’s the title of Louis Freeh’s article in yesterday’s Opinion Journal. The title couldn’t be more apt.

Here are the keys to Freeh’s op-ed:

It was interesting to hear from the 9/11 Commission again on Tuesday. This self-perpetuating and privately funded group of lobbyists and lawyers has recently opined on hurricanes, nuclear weapons, the Baltimore Harbor Tunnel and even the New York subway system. Now it offers yet another “report card” on the progress of the FBI and CIA in the war against terrorism, along with its “back-seat” take and some further unsolicited narrative about how things ought to be on the “front lines.”
Yet this is also a good time for the country to make some assessments of the 9/11 Commission itself. Recent revelations from the military intelligence operation code-named “Able Danger” have cast light on a missed opportunity that could have potentially prevented 9/11. Specifically, Able Danger concluded in February 2000 that military experts had identified Mohamed Atta by name (and maybe photograph) as an al Qaeda agent operating in the U.S.
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There are other questions that need answers. Was Able Danger intelligence provided to the 9/11 Commission prior to the finalization of its report, and, if so, why was it not explored? In sum, what did the 9/11 commissioners and their staff know about Able Danger and when did they know it?

Mr. Freeh’s answers to those questions aren’t flattering to the would-be do-gooders on the 9/11 Commission. Here’s what Mr. Freeh said in answering those questions:

The Able Danger intelligence, if confirmed, is undoubtedly the most relevant fact of the entire post-9/11 inquiry. Even the most junior investigator would immediately know that the name and photo ID of Atta in 2000 is precisely the kind of tactical intelligence the FBI has many times employed to prevent attacks and arrest terrorists. Yet the 9/11 Commission inexplicably concluded that it “was not historically significant.” This astounding conclusion, in combination with the failure to investigate Able Danger and incorporate it into its findings, raises serious challenges to the commission’s credibility and, if the facts prove out, might just render the commission historically insignificant itself.

What’s striking to me is the wording that the 9/11 Commission used in reference to Able Danger. Had they said that Able Danger wasn’t credible, that’s one thing. I’d argue with them but that’d sound alot better. But for them to say that it “was not historically significant” is assinine. As Freeh points out, “the most junior investigator would immediately know that the name and photo ID of Atta in 2000 is precisely the kind of tactical intelligence the FBI has many times employed to prevent attacks and arrest terrorists.”

This statement, combined with their reluctance to have Commissioner Jamie Gorelick testify as to why she built the wall that prevented the CIA from talking with the FBI, makes this Commission a laughingstock. It gets worse when their admonishments include that the Bush administration didn’t “connect the dots” as well as it should have.

Had these idiots subpoenaed Gorelick to testify, they would’ve been asking her to explain why the dots couldn’t have gotten connected. If they’d been the least bit interested in Able Danger, they could’ve found that their work was exactly what needs to be done. Instead, they’ve written Able Danger off. Shame on the Commission.

Two members of Congress, Curt Weldon and Dan Burton, have also publicly stated that shortly after the 9/11 attacks they provided then-Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley with a “chart” containing pre-attack information collected by Able Danger about al Qaeda.

I’d find it difficult, if not impossible, to believe that the 9/11 Commission could discredit Weldon’s and Burton’s contentions that “they provided then-Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley with a “chart” containing pre-attack information collected by Able Danger about al Qaeda. The reality is that Able Danger did what everyone’s been clamoring for, namely, they connected the dots without classified documents.

Tony Schaffer, Scott Philpott and others involved with Able Danger shouldn’t be discredited. They should be credited for the great work they did.

Cross-posted at LetFreedomRing

One Response to ““An Incomplete Investigation””

  1. dave in boca Says:

    The struggle to get a monster coverup by elitist all-stars like Kean and Lee Hamilton has been heroic.

    Again and again, the inability of the US Gov to investigate itself manifests a colossal praetorian guard minded by both parties.

    Jamie Gorelick more than any other US official is responsible for 9/11. Actually Bill Clinton might deserve that trophy for letting Bin Laden flee from Sudan and for appointing radical Left Nomenklatura like Gorelick to DOJ. But the MSM does not hold the Democrats accountable; and thus the Dems feel an entitlement to cover up.

    While the Republicans must fight off the criminalization of politics like the Plame Affaire. Read about that at isteve.com and his link to my blog, dave in boca.

    Journalism is becoming trivialized and Woodward was correct in not cooperating in the witch hunt organized by the MSM posse on Plame.

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