Al-Qaeda Admits They Are Losing In Iraq
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi released a rare video of himself on April 25th, 2006, mocking the US military in Iraq, touting himself as a proficient military man and urging Iraqis to unite with him against US forces in Iraq.
Last Thursday, May 4, 2006, the Department of Defense released the video portions of al-Zarqawi’s previous propaganda tape that were edited out. They showed an embarrassing reality for al-Qaeda that al-Zarqawi is no military man, but simply a thug terrorist. [Watch the DOD video of al-Zarqawi]
The tape was confiscated in an al-Qaeda safehouse during an April 16, 2006 raid in the Yusifiyah area of Baghdad. CENTCOM reports that “Coalition Forces discovered a large amount of documents and videos ranging from plans to critiques including al Qaida in Iraq’s strategy in Baghdad, and how the terrorist organization lacks leadership, military capability and Iraqi support.” AQIZ (al-Qaeda Iraq) Documents authored by an al-Qaeda leader are an astounding look into the failing mission of al-Qaeda in Iraq. CENTCOM reports:
“The discovery of theses documents is extremely relevant. This information confirms what the Government of Iraq, Coalition Forces and ultimately the people of Iraq already know - that AQIZ’s role only attempts to impede Iraqis in following the road to prosperity, security and national unity,†said MNF-I spokesman, Brig. Gen. Rudy Wright.
Read the entire document ( A glance at the reality of Baghdad in light of the latest events [sectarian turmoil]) Here are some of the highlights in the words of al-Qaeda:
*Note: al-Qaeda describes themselves as ‘Mujahideen’, which in Arabic literally means “struggler”. It is a term used to describe one who engages in Jihad (holy war) or is a “holy warrior”.
– Most of the mujahidin power lies in surprise attacks (hit and run) or setting up explosive charges and booby traps. This is a different matter than a battle with organized forces that possess machinery and suitable communications networks. The only power the mujahidin have is what they have already demonstrated in hunting down drifted patrols and taking sniper shots at those patrol members who stray far from their patrols, or planting booby traps among the citizens and hiding among them in the hope that the explosions will injure an American or members of the government. In other words, these activities could be understood as hitting the scared and the hiding ones, which is an image that requires a concerted effort to change, as well as Allah’s wisdom.
– The strength of the brothers in Baghdad is built mainly on booby trapped cars, and most of the mujahidin groups in Baghdad are generally groups of assassin without any organized military capabilities.– There is a clear absence of organization among the groups of the brothers in Baghdad, whether at the leadership level in Baghdad, the brigade leaders, or their groups therein. Coordination among them is very difficult, which appears clearly when the group undertake a join operations.
– The policy followed by the brothers in Baghdad is a media oriented policy without a clear comprehensive plan to capture an area or an enemy center. Other word, the significance of the strategy of their work is to show in the media that the American and the government do not control the situation and there is resistance against them. This policy dragged us to the type of operations that are attracted to the media, and we go to the streets from time to time for more possible noisy operations which follow the same direction.
– At the same time, the Americans and the Government were able to absorb our painful blows, sustain them, compensate their losses with new replacements, and follow strategic plans which allowed them in the past few years to take control of Baghdad as well as other areas one after the other. That is why every year is worse than the previous year as far as the Mujahidin’s control and influence over Baghdad.
– It has been proven from the course of the events that the American investment in the Party and the Committee were not in vain. In spite of the gravity of the events, they were able to calm down the Sunni people, justify the enemy deeds, and give the enemy the opportunity to do more work without any recourse and supervision.
– The mujahidin do not have any stored weapons and ammunition in their possession in Baghdad, particularly rockets, such as C5K Katyosha or bomber or mortars which we realized their importance and shortage in Baghdad. That was due to lack of check and balance, and proper follow-ups.
– (Salah), the military commander of Baghdad (he used to be the commander of the Rassafah County and still is) is a courageous young man with a good determination but he has little and simple experience in the military field and does not have a clear vision about the current stage and how to deal with it. Most of his work at al-Rassafah County is to take cars to the Jubur Arab Tribes, convert them into booby traps and take them back inside Baghdad for explosion. And the more booby trap cars he makes, the more success he has. This alone is not a work plan and we do not benefit from it in the medium range let alone the long range.
– (Salah): The current commander of Northern al-Karkh (Abu-Huda) is very concerned because of his deteriorating security situation caused by being pursued by the Americans, since they have his picture and voice print. Therefore, his movement is very restricted and he is unable to do anything here. We should remove him from Baghdad to a location where he can work easier; otherwise he is closer to become totally ineffective. I know nothing about his past military experience or organizational skills.
– (Salah): Northern al-Karkh groups are estimated at 40 mujahid, so is the Southern Karkh. They could double that number if necessary. Al-Rassafah groups in general is estimated at 30 mujahidin as I was informed by the commander of al-Rassafah. These are very small numbers compared to the tens of thousands of the enemy troops. How can we increase these numbers?
What an astounding find for coalition forces! Clearly this is an undeniable victory for both the United States and Iraq, one which the Mainstream Media (MSM) has overtly overlooked. Military leaders in Iraq, as well as the new Iraqi leaders, have been saying for many months that we are winning in Iraq, although it has been dismissed by liberals, Democrats and agenda driven reporters.
However, Al-Qaeda in this document, along with the edited parts of the al-Zarqawi video showing him as less than a military man and more like a blackmarket thug in American sneakers, clearly says that:
- al-Qaeda is outnumbered
- al-Qaeda is outwitted
- al-Qaeda uses fear targeting nervous Iraqis
- al-Qaeda is inept to carry out missions bigger than hit and runs
- al-Qaeda does not have a comprehensive plan
- al-Qaeda is using the media for propaganda
- al-Qaeda’s Jihad is “getting worse year after year” because of Iraqi and US resolve and resiliency
- al-Qaeda is trying to divide and conquer Iraq through sectarian violence
- “American investment in the Party and the Committee were not in vain.”
President Bush’s strategy to take the fight to Iraq is right on the money. One of the greatest resources in Iraq is its people; that is, a very resilient “battle hardened” people who know from living under a Hussein regime the value of freedom and democracy, and understand that casualties and perseverance are necessary for the good of all in Iraq. They are fed up with terrorism and the insurgency and yet enlist in the Iraqi military, security and police forces in droves to fight the good fight for their children and future generations. Life under a brutal dictator has made Iraqis a very unique people, well worth fighting for. They understand, as President has said:
“In the long term the best way to defeat an ideology of hatred is with an ideology of hope.”
It IS working. Don’t believe those who say it isn’t.
Cross-posted at Amy’s Blog
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