California Conservative

As the chief of Los Angeles’ latest commission, civil rights lawyer Connie Rice leads a predictable group of politically-appointed pseudo-intellectuals hoping to rip off taxpayers again, this time under the pretext of fighting crime.

Politicians and the media call it a blue ribbon commission, as if blue ribbons somehow make biased commissions more believable. Ms. Rice punctuates her report with non-specific rage, authorized by Council members named Garcetti and Hahn, to paint aging and dead liberals (also named Garcetti and Hahn) in generic terms despite their legacy as our city’s greatest, albeit friendliest menace.

At $3,800 a page, the Advanced Project Report’s 131-pages are painfully unreadable for taxpayers who, its authors hope, will agree to waste even more taxes for two or three more decades of socialist incoherence: Incoherence that has nurtured LA’s violent criminal insurgency to lead one World Health Organization epidemiologist to compare violent crime in Los Angeles to diarrhea in Bangladesh. Having lived and worked in LA and West Bengal, I question the slur against Asian disease.

With the help of LAUSD’s unapologetically misspent billions, liberal democrats have controlled LA since the 1960s, sending their children to private schools while condemning generations of public schoolchildren who survive to tag our streets with their blood. After forty years of experimental social vandalism, their democrat progeny isn’t about to appoint lawyers to commissions that threaten their entrenched political power. Ms. Rice won’t bite the tax-grabbing hands that feed her.

This latest commission of experts includes no police officers, active or retired. When politicians pay lawyers to report on medicine, education, or public safety without at least a fifty-percent participation of real doctors, teachers, or cops, we can expect the candor of a Klan report on the “black experience.”

I won’t waste time attacking all 130 pages. The Executive Summary and Recommendations summarize their drivel. But before we explore the report, let me explain how I attacked gangs and crime during the 1980s and saved Los Angeles residents more than $200 million.

The Addict & Crime

When I was a street cop, my most effective tool was Health & Safety Code §11550, a law that prohibits anyone from being under the influence of a controlled substance without a valid prescription. The law required rehabilitation, or incarceration for at least 90 days.

The connection between drug abuse and crime is clear. And while not all drug abusers are gang members or felons, the overwhelming majority of felons and gang members are drug users or addicts. Crime is their full-time occupation and a condition of gang membership. The more crime and violence a member commits, the more prestige he enjoys. The murder of rivals and cops enhances their social status.

Cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine addicts are incapable of sustained employment. Unless independently wealthy (i.e., Elizabeth Taylor, Betty Ford, Courtney Love), addicts must find alternative ways to support their lifestyle and intoxication. Public shelters don’t admit the intoxicated, so addicts spend most of their time looking for targets to rob and steal, while others prostitute themselves for drugs, spreading AIDS and other STDs through the community.

Cops & Robbers

So instead of prowling the streets looking for suspicious activity or the chance capture of the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted, smart cops know that, to find felons, they need go no further than to visit known drug dealers and hangouts. After a few minutes in the shadows, felons and gang members arrive as expected.

Felons don’t usually spend more than a few moments with dealers. There are exceptions. Some addicted flop house residents allow addicts to spend the night, grab a bite or take showers. Burglars and prostitutes who deliver goods and services may stay longer but, for the most part, transactions take seconds. It is then up to cops to know when and who to follow as their probable cause (PC) develops.

It doesn’t take long before an addicted pedestrian or driver violates a traffic law or signal. Addicted drivers are usually too preoccupied to think of vehicle maintenance, signals, or seatbelts. Either way, their behavior and eventual detention presents enough PC to initiate a dialogue, which officers use to identify the conclusive signs of intoxication that lead to arrest. And after their arrest, the required inventory of the impounded car and personal possessions often yields evidence of other crimes, including drugs, weapons, and stolen property.

From 1985 through 1989, I used §11550 to arrest four or five addicts each day. When I arrested less than five, I felt as though I’d cheated taxpayers. So for most of those four years, I arrested a daily average of 4.5, or 22 a week. And if we accept that I worked on the streets for 40 weeks a year, I probably arrested 900 felons and gang members by the end of each year. I worked much more than 40 weeks, but we can conservatively say the other twelve weeks accounted for vacations, illness, desk duty, training days, and so forth. I worked nights so court wasn’t a factor.

FBI statistics then suggested that most criminals commit more than eighty crimes for every one arrest. My hundreds of interviews with addicts suggested a daily average of between five and ten crimes a day to support their addiction and lifestyle.

§11550 H&S was a powerful crime-fighting tool because convictions required a minimum 90-day jail sentence. Judges could sentence addicts to more time, but not less.

My work and careful study resulted in a 100 percent filing and conviction rate. I was almost always able to obtain legal confessions, photographs, and urine or blood evidence from addicts who I promised to release without bail in exchange for their cooperation. And when they failed to appear in court, arrest warrants allowed other officers a way to arrest them later when they were nothing more than “suspicious characters.”

One Cop’s Cost Savings

As stated before, I used this tool from 1985-1989. During that 48 month period, I averaged 4.5 §11550 arrests a day, 22 each week, or 900 addicts a year (assuming 40 weeks a year on the street). During that four-year period I made roughly 2,700 §11550 arrests.

The typical drug addict commits at least five property crimes each day to support themselves and their addictions. Their thefts (burglary, robbery, shoplift, burglary or theft from motor vehicle, plain theft) are not dollar for dollar: That is, the replacement cost for a watch, DVD player, plasma TV, purse, or cell phone usually costs much more than fees paid by a fence. Addicts might get $100 for a $3000 plasma TV, or $200 for a Cartier watch that the fence will resell for $500. So for computational ease, let’s assume that each crime represents an average $50 loss to victims. Addicts who commit five crimes a day represent a minimum property loss of $250 (5 crimes X $50).

I didn’t include the repair costs of a broken door or window, or the health costs from being attacked by robbers, the injuries, hospitalization, lost work, psychological trauma, and so forth, nor will I include the costs for addict rehabilitation, incarceration, or international drug interdiction efforts.

But by using these conservative numbers we can accept that by arresting one addict who spends 90 days in jail, I’ve effectively prevented 450 crimes (five crimes X 90 days) and the property loss of $22,500 ($50 X 450 crimes).

And if we assume a minimum replacement cost of $50 per stolen item (it is far greater), we can estimate another $22,500, bringing the total cost savings to victims (and their insurers) at $45,000 during 90 days of incarceration.

Taxpayers spend at least $300 for police to investigate these crimes, which includes gas, vehicle maintenance, uniform and equipment wear and tear, administrative costs, training, and follow-up reports. Not every crime is reported to police, so if we assume that 200 of those 450 crimes are reported, we will spend $60,000 to investigate those 200 crimes.

To summarize, this means that if one addict is sentenced to 90 days in jail, LA residents and taxpayers will save at least $105,000 in property loss and investigative costs.

I can safely estimate that from 1985-1989, I arrested 2,700 addicts. Many addicts were sentenced to more than 90 days, but if we assume that all of those 2,700 addicts were sentenced to 90 days in jail, we can roughly estimate that my efforts alone saved LA residents and taxpayers at least $283,500,000 (million) in lost property and tax revenues.

If ten officers were allowed to duplicate my efforts, the cost savings in prevented crime could represent billions of dollars.

The End of §11550

My efforts ended in 1989 with a call from the Valley Bureau Narcotics Division. Until then, I’d enjoyed a 100 percent filing rate. I’d participated in more than fifty trials and preliminary hearings, and most defendants eventually pled guilty, served out their sentences, or returned to jail on parole or probation violations.

So when the filing team said that a judge had dismissed 30 of my cases, I was concerned. For many years, I subscribed to the Peace Officer’s Legal Sourcebook, a publication that keeps officers up to date on the latest case law regarding powers of arrest, search and seizure, and evidence rules. More often than not, I memorized the latest case law before judges and prosecutors were aware of them.

“What happened to my cases?” I asked the narcotics filing team. They didn’t know. I asked the filing deputy city attorney who agreed there was nothing wrong with them. So I visited the judge.

“Well first of all,” she said with condescending authority, “You have no right to shine a flashlight on any individual. That’s an illegal detention.”

She knew she had goofed as I recited the recent case law. Startled, she bluffed me with four other bogus reasons and I quoted each case back to her. And when it became clear that she had dismissed my cases without cause, she ordered me to leave her chambers.

I returned to a startled city attorney who concluded a phone call saying, “Yes ma’am… yes, your Honor…” When he hung up he said, “I don’t know what you told her, but she’s pissed.”

When I returned to work, my captain reminded me that I could not talk to judges the way I did. I was soon reassigned to the windowless jail at Foothill Division, no longer allowed on the streets to arrest criminals.

I never arrested another drug addict again. I later transferred to motorcycle traffic enforcement. Mine was the last name on the eligibility list.

I didn’t fully understand until years later when I realized that there weren’t enough courts, judges, prosecutors, or jails available to accommodate my 900 arrests every year. I’d hoped that my efforts would force expansion of the courts, jails, and prosecutor offices. Instead, I had simply overwhelmed city resources. The judge was young and had been placed in the unenviable position of lying to a cop. She, along with the City Attorney, Chief of Police, and LA politicians would not tell the public the truth. It was easier to relieve the pressure by letting criminals pillage neighborhoods and sequestering cops who didn’t know their place.

There are also political advantages to undermining the police. As long as officers are chasing preventable crimes, the public is left with the impression that cops are doing their jobs. Much like Chief Bratton’s adolescent use of emergency lights and sirens, the public feels safer although far less gets done today. And when it comes to politics, perception is really all that matters.

LA’s Latest Sham Commission

This brings us back to the City Council’s $500,000 payoff to Connie Rice for her bogus commission.

In its 131 pages, Connie explains everything except what I have explained. Had a few experienced and honest cops been included in her circle of political friends, her report might have been more relevant, shorter, and less costly.

Yes, criminal gangs are a problem, but most turf wars stem from competing narcotics markets and sales. Until this week, drug addicts were considered non-violent criminals, which gave LA County Sheriff Roy Baca justification to release them after only spending a few days or weeks in jail. Baca has now decided that gang members will no longer be released early. Way to go, Barney.

In her report summary, Connie Rice quotes a World Health Organization (WHO) expert who says, “Los Angeles is to violence what Bangladesh is to diarrhea.” And since LA ranked 35th in 2003, it’s hard to understand how Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa and LAPD’s East Coast chief could describe LA as America’s second safest big city today without juking the numbers or gagging from an overdose of cannabis brownies.

Let’s set aside Bangladesh diarrhea and compare LA to Iraq. As CNN’s Henry Schuster reported in Iraq Insurgency 101 (Oct 2005), Iraq’s 24 million residents suffer from an estimated insurgency of 200,000, which include 25,000-30,000 actual fighters who are supported by various active and passive supporters, fund-raisers, lookouts, and family members. That’s a one fighter per 800 civilians in Iraq. By comparison, LA’s 4.3 million residents are routinely victimized by 40,000 violent gang members, or one violent gang member per 107 LA residents! Because Iraq’s insurgency is roughly one-eighth the size of LA’s insurgency, we should probably be thankful that they don’t have access to artillery shells or anti-aircraft weapons, yet. I’m surprised that Ms. Rice hasn’t blamed the LAPD for fueling the insurgency or hasn’t demanded a gradual withdrawal of police forces from besieged neighborhoods.

Recommendation

If the LAPD maintains current staffing levels, we’ll have more than enough officers to effectively prevent crime in Los Angeles.

Police officers can be extremely effective when we hire applicants based upon merit rather than color or gender. Cops who aren’t weighed down by consent decrees, triplicate paperwork, or the absence of prosecutorial, judicial, and custodial resources can be as effective as I was during the 1980s. While I understand the political allure that liberals benefit from the perception of a dysfunctional and racist police department in need of perpetual reform, or the financial advantages of increasing police ranks to increase union dues that support political candidates, the LAPD does not need more cops. And if we keep criminals behind bars, there will be fewer criminals to keep cops busy.

I’ve illustrated how my four-year effort alone saved LA residents nearly $300 million in crime and tax revenues. Think of what ten, or 500, officers can do with the real support of the politicians, courts, prosecutors, and jails. Without increasing taxes like last year’s wholly unnecessary trash tax, or Ms. Rice’s proposed $50 million anti-gang tax hike, real cops doing real work with the right resources will make unnecessary the kind of tax increases that LA politicians love to waste.

Besides tax hikes, the rest of Connie’s recommendations include, 1) a demand for the necessary political will to fight criminals (instead of fighting LA cops), 2) meeting the unmet needs of children (e.g., tax hikes), 3) ending costly City practices (like publishing Rice’s $500,000 report), 4) a demand for new streams of funding (higher taxes), 5) involving LAUSD (why not involve MS-13 too?), expanding City and LAUSD resources (more taxes again)…

Do you see a pattern? Politicians: I) create the gang problem by crippling the LAPD with consent decrees, hiring quotas, insufficient resources, and unnecessary paperwork, II) blame the LAPD for predictable failures, and III) demand higher taxes to attack problems they created.

Yup – LA residents can be very proud of leaders like Connie Rice. But just to be safe, keep your hand on your wallet.

This entry was posted on Wednesday, January 24th, 2007 at 5:31 pm and is filed under Author: Clark Baker, Corruption, Crime, Liberals, Los Angeles. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.